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Introduction
1
  
It is almost banal now to say that the uprisings, protests and occupy 
movements that have engulfed the globe since 2011 have been similar in 
both content and structure. Idiosyncrasy notwithstanding, it will not sound 
unlikely if we are reminded that these protests shared frustration in relation 
to the tyranny of the global markets. In this sense, the different protests 
coalesced into one event, which was a testimony to the rise of a specific type 
of citizenship, ushered by neoliberalism. The question which this study 
probes, then, is whether we are the same citizens we were before that civil 
awakening that spilled over from tyrannical Arab states to core cities of the 
global economy and beyond. To address this question theoretically, I trace 
back the political articulation and social amalgamation of the citizen as a 
rights-bearing individual which resulted in the “victory of the liberals,” to 
paraphrase Dean (2009: 18). This victory, I propose, is attributed to the rise 
of New Social Movements (NSMs), civil society and deliberative and radical 
democracy, that performed as both the interpreters of this change and its 
vehicles since the 1950s. The victory however, ended in a defeat, when 
neoliberals hijacked the idea of the rights-bearing individual turning her into 
a figure motivated by a single freedom, i.e., free to make a choice (Brown 
2003). Against this backdrop, the moment of 2011 calls for an explanation, 
but also for a new explanatory approach.  
Seeking to give new meaning and significance to this moment, I focus on 
the Israeli Tents’ Protest as a case in point, placing it in the longue durée with 
two aims in mind. By tracing this event back to earlier acts of resistance 
under the light of neoliberalism entrenchment, and by extending the analysis 
to the post-protest entailments, I seek to see the protest beyond its im-
mediate manifestations. I hence reject its depiction as a protest of and for the 
middle class, and thereby, I refuse the implicit or explicit insinuations that 
protests that spawned in the social margins were only its side-effects. Rather, 
seeing the Tents’ Protest as a part of a whole allows me to offer a corrective 
to common explanations that fail to account for the contribution of 
marginalized agents to the advancement of citizenship.  
                                                        
1 Acknowledgments: I dedicate this study to the activists who shared their experiences and 
thoughts with me, and for allowing me to use their stories in my attempt to shed light on the 
important political work that they do. I am humbled by their courage and commitment to 
social justice. As always, I thank Dana Kaplan for her endless support and valuable 
intellectual partnership. Thanks also go to the editors and anonymous readers for their 
helpful comments, and to Harriet Gimpel for her careful editing of this article. 
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This serves my second aim of generalizing on the trajectory of citizenship 
beyond the Israeli context. Three main reasons make this plausible: first, the 
Tents’ Protest was one of many protests that engulfed the world, and for 
which proximity and domino-like unfolding suggest that they were not 
isolated from one another (Castells 2012); second, these events engaged in 
learning from each other, allowing the migration of ideas and methods 
between them (e.g., Castells 2012: 141; Cole 2014); and, finally, their 
resemblance also resulted from them addressing similar issues and 
grievances (Levy 2014). In this respect, delving deeply into one case may 
prove beneficial for the purpose of making generalizations. One argument I 
want to put forward, one which does not presume to exhaust all that can be 
said about 2011, is that it pointed out to a new trajectory of citizenship, and 
particularly, to a shift from rights-based citizenship to a quest for new modes 
of voice and representation.  
The empirical chapter is based on an ongoing study of post 2011 Israeli 
society. It draws mainly on interviews with activists, some which I conducted 
personally and others conducted in collaboration with my colleagues.2 My 
observations have also been informed by following the activity of some of 
these players in the social media, primarily on Facebook. To a limited degree, 
I myself became involved in some of the latter activity not merely as a 
bystander, but by engaging in debates and conversations.3 Conceptually and 
theoretically, this paper draws from recent writing on citizenship acts and 
the enactment of citizenship (Isin and Nelson 2008; Isin 2012), as well as on 
citizenship “beyond the state” (Stack and Trevor 2007; and in the Israeli 
context see Levy and Massalha 2012). It pays particular attention to citizen 
participation writ large (Tully 2008), and focuses on the actors themselves, 
exploring their vocabulary and listening to the words they weave into their 
actions (Tully 2008: 136-137; Emmerich 2011; Levy 2014; Cox 2014: 958).  
Thereafter this study unfolds in three parts. First I explore the figure of the 
rights-based citizen through the perspective of the three epistemic frame-
works of NSMs, civil society, and deliberative and radical democracy that have 
shaped it. This will take me to the neoliberal shift and to a discussion of the 
inception of the 2011 protest in the broader context of acts of resistance to 
                                                        
2 This research was supported by the Research Authority of The Open University, Israel. I 
thank my colleagues Dr. Mohammad Massalha and Dr. Ilana Kaufman for allowing me to use 
material from our collaborative work. I bear the sole responsibility for the arguments and 
the interpretation of these materials.  
3 Yet, I do not consider myself an activist due to my limited involvement, especially since my 
main interest is with those who were not, so to speak, “keyboard activists” but rather 
physically engaged in political action on the streets.  
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the entrenchment of neoliberalism. It is followed by a more thorough 
exploration of two post-2011 activists groups, in the Jewish and Palestinian 
citizens’ societies respectively. It brings to the fore the voices that came out 
of the 2011 protest of those who refused to see it dying. My main argument is 
that what the 2011 moment showed was a shift in the conception of 
citizenship that extended from the margins of society to the center. It was a 
moment when the extant neoliberal practices of governance (Tully 2008) 
were contested, and the terms of politicization were changing. These new 
terms were set in the margins, allowing for a new figure of citizen whose 
main concerns are representation and voice to emerge. 
The rise of rights-based citizenship and beyond 
In the decades preceding the 2008 economic crisis and the 2011 uprisings, 
when globalization was permeating all corners of the globe, political and 
economic leaders were constantly trailed by anti-globalization protesters, 
later known as the alter-globalization movement (e.g., Bramble 2006). This 
protest was as nomadic as the G-8 and G-20 summits, and it emulated the 
idea of global leadership by forming the World Social Forum (WSF) which 
met for the first time in Brazil in 2001. The latter became significant for later 
events because it called for bottom-up initiatives and sought to create a 
repertoire of egalitarian decision making tools (Polletta 2014: 83). Yet, as the 
protest went global, Arundahti Roy noted that, “The free market does not 
threaten national sovereignty, it undermines democracy.”4 Thus, when the 
anti-dictatorial uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt erupted and spilled over to the 
Arab world, they served as a reminder that the challenge of globalization 
needed to be fought at home (Hardt and Negri 2012). It thus brought the 
struggle back to the field of citizenship, however, this relationship between 
the citizenry and their governments have since taken a new turn. Let me 
explain this by elaborating on the relationship between citizenship and 
struggle for social change.  
In the post-1945 era, three moments mark the mutual conceptualizing of 
modern citizenship and the consolidation of citizen participation: between 
the 1950s and 1960s, we saw a shift from mostly class-based social move-
ments to New Social Movements that sought to extend citizenship rights by 
means of mass mobilization beyond class and partisanship; since the 1970s, 
we witnessed the expansion of civil society in the face of the shrinking of the 
political; and from the 1980s we saw the weakening of liberal democracy met 
by models of deliberative and radical democracy seeking social solidarity and 
                                                        
4 World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, Brazil, January 27, 2003. Retrieved on March 14, 2015. 
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political participation. NSMs, civil society and radical democracy were not 
mere descriptive or theoretical concepts. Rather, they extended beyond their 
analytical power to inform our sociological and political understanding of 
what is to be done (Cox 2014; Lipschutz 2006: xv). They called upon citizens 
to act and enact their citizenship, inasmuch as they (re)shaped citizenship 
and the ethos of citizen participation and our vocabulary on social change.  
The end of World War II opened a new era for capitalist democracies 
when citizenship was considered to be profoundly changing the status of 
many, while their consolidated civil, political and social rights was reducing 
the tension between capitalism and equality (Marshall 1998). Indeed, the rise 
of the welfare state in these societies and economic growth (Streeck 2011), 
brought about New Social Movements that sought to extend citizenship rights 
to those who were forsaken by previous class based struggles, i.e., women, 
people of color, gays and lesbians, etc. Progress also induced new demands, 
namely to critically confront the bad effects of modernization and 
bureaucratization on both the environment and society. These struggles 
were mostly led by middle class citizens, who were using their own mix of 
economic, social and cultural capital in advancing post-material values. They 
further entrenched the figure of the citizen in their likening, as male, middle 
class and white. Still, their struggle also resulted in extending the politics of 
redistribution to other groups (e.g., Purcell 2013; Rose 1996; Streeck 2011; 
Therborn 2012), thus rendering themselves vehicles for materializing the 
principles of universality and egalitarianism that underpin the ideal of 
modern citizenship (Pfister 2012: 244).  
The pressure for redistribution eventually spurred a parallel demand for 
recognition and a new politics of identity (Kymlicka and Norman 1994). In 
the 1970s, the idea that economic progress is a right “translated into political 
expectations, which governments felt constrained to honour but were less 
and less able to, as growth began to slow” (Streeck 2011: 10; cf. Brown 2003; 
Harvey 2007). Governments responded by rolling back from society and 
letting the markets come to the fore (Mitchell 1991), allowing civil society to 
appear as an interim terrain, where struggles for redistribution or 
recognition are neither political nor do they interfere with the freedom of the 
markets (cf. Dean 2009: 15-6; Cherniavsky 2009: 15). The image of the 
citizen was accordingly the sum of her functions as a consumer or taxpayer 
(Hall 2012: 20), devoid of political faculties other than choosing, but with 
only a little control over the choice she can make (Levy 2014). 
These changes were now directing societies on the path of neo-
liberalization. This, as Roy suggested above, harmed the democratic aspects 
of national states, giving rise to concerns amongst thinkers and political 
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activists alike. While the quest for citizenship rights seemed to be 
accomplished, the questions of citizen participation and social solidarity 
were surfacing. Deliberative democracy was bound to resuscitate the political 
left which was the main victim of the shift to neoliberalism (Dean 2009; 
Mouffe 2000; Benhabib 2004; Glover 2014). Differences in approach 
notwithstanding, liberal and radical thinkers were equally delineating 
models for political participation that remained highly intellectualized, and, 
against their will nonetheless, exclusivist, and, to cite McNay (2014), 
“weightless” (see also, Dean 2009: 77-8; Glover 2014: 95; Honig 2001). Thus, 
when class politics were no longer on the agenda of the left, and the middle 
class was shunning ideology leaving the stage for the right (Dean 2009) –
which has done a much better job in mobilizing passions towards neoliberal 
designs, to paraphrase Mouffe’s (2000: 103) lament on the failure of the 
democrats—the public sphere was further depoliticized. In the global south, 
neoliberalization and globalization in some contrast, seemed to fuel the 
public sphere with renewed political energies.  
Globalization made headways into the global south on the back of 
international corporations and powerful governments, and, all the more 
significant, into entities such as the IMF and the World Bank. Its entailments 
included the NGOization of societies and the rise of civil society among 
others, even under more autocratic regimes (Lipschutz 2006). NGOs were 
occasionally instrumental in changing the Arab societies (e.g., Cole 2013), 
rendering civil society a counterbalance to the powers of (authoritarian) 
states and (neoliberal) markets. Some NGOs also contributed to the popular 
mobilization of 2011, that was eventually carried out by the politics that 
transpired in the streets and squares. These, notably, inspired citizens 
elsewhere who had not yet dared rising against the neoliberal order on their 
own grounds (e.g., Dean 2009: 22). Then, the discourse of liberal democracy 
and the figure of the citizen as a rights-bearing individual could not suffice to 
either describe or explain the newness of the moment.  
What instead?  
We are still living the legacy of these paradigmatic frameworks of NSMs, civil 
society, and deliberative and radical models of democracy. All were critical in 
shaping the contemporary rights discourse and rendering citizenship 
paramount in forming the relationships between subjects and states, and 
between citizens themselves (Isin 2009). Indeed, the rights discourse has 
changed the practices of governance and is the mainstay in contemporary 
politics (e.g., Brown 2003; Hall 2012). Even for critical philosophers like 
Raymond Geuss (2001: 150), it has become a matter of fact to claim that, 
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“rights discourse will continue to flourish.” Under neoliberalism, the evolving 
rights discourse persists not for its intrinsic value to sustaining individual 
freedoms, inasmuch as it helps maintain a seemingly orderly, liberal society 
based on relatively efficient markets (Ibid., 154). Put differently, in neoliberal 
times, everyone—citizens and non-citizens alike—have become consumers 
of human rights and customers of a choice agenda (Hall 2012: 20). What 
eventually drove people to the streets was the growing understanding that 
things can’t remain as they had been, or to cite the WSF slogan, “another 
world is possible.” Yet, any attempt to theorize this moment is bound to fail, if 
only for the simple truth that “those who theorize the Occupy movement … 
cannot speak with authorial voice ‘on behalf of’ or ‘for’ the movement” 
(Harcourt 2013).  
What is needed instead is a more nuanced analysis of how the ethos of 
citizen participation (Tully 2008) and citizenship are articulated and 
reconstituted in the vicissitudes of everyday life (Isin and Nyers 2014). 
Thinking of the evolution of citizenship as an agonic game (Tully 2008) is a 
way of seeing the participants in these relationships—be they the universal 
citizens as articulated in NSMs, the legal subjects in civil society and 
consumers in neoliberal markets—as they were re-defining the forms of 
citizen participation, changing de facto the rules of recognition, and allowing 
for new participants to be recognized as claimants of rights (Tully 2008; Isin 
2009; Isin and Nielsen 2008; McNevin 2011). In this historical context, by 
focusing on how the citizens of 2011 around the globe participate in these 
agonic games, I aim to further account for the ways these events brought 
about new forms of participation and new contestations of the (neoliberal) 
practices of governance (Tully 2008: 154). It is in this context that I now turn 
to the Israeli Tents’ Protest where the players became engaged in a new 
agonic game, shifting, as I propose, the ethos of citizen participation from the 
realm of rights to that of voice and representation.  
From neoliberalism to protest  
On July 14, 2011 a young, middle class, professional woman from Tel Aviv 
called upon her Facebook friends to pitch tents on Rothschild Boulevard to 
protest the rising rent (Gordon 2012; Grinberg 2013; Ram and Filc 2014). 
This act sparked a summer long protest that drove hundreds of thousands of 
Israelis to the streets. Yet, if we are to understand the Tents’ Protest as 
neither isolated nor sui generis, and more pertinently, as epitomizing 
significant elements of the uprisings in the Arab world and the dis-
enchantment of citizens in capitalist democracies, this moment will not 
suffice. In fact, in order not to underestimate the significance of this event, 
7
Levy: From Rights To Representation: Challenging Citizenship From The M
Published by Iowa Research Online, 2015
which for many is now seen as ephemeral or disappointing, I ask to stretch 
its boundaries in two ways. One way is by tracing the protest’s roots back to 
the millennial turn, to the rekindling of the Al Aqsa Intifada (September 
2000), when neoliberal measures started undermining the welfare state. And 
I also look at its extension beyond 2011, as manifested in the political 
activism, effervescent ever since in the streets. The second way is expanding 
my perspective to include not only middle class protesters, but also those 
who emerged from the margins, before, during, and after the summer 
protest. This framing, I propose, will facilitate taking better account of the 
vicissitudes of citizenship before and after 2011.  
The neoliberal entrenchment and the origins of the Tents’ Protest 
At the turn of the millennium, middle class Israeli Jews were reassured that 
they were enjoying the trickling down of economic growth. Indeed, around 
the globe the middle class began feeling the burden of neoliberal policies 
(Harvey 2012: 11; Sassen 2011), and yet the Israeli-Jewish middle class felt 
protected. Even the long 1998 student strike which, according to Grinberg, 
was the precursor of 2011, received little attention. Shalev (2012: 167) 
showed that the decline in earnings of the young, middle class cohort began 
at some time between these two points, five years prior to their gathering in 
the streets in protest of skyrocketing prices of housing and goods. This 
decline spread unevenly, effecting men less than women, but poorer 
Israelis—Palestinian citizens, ultra-Orthodox Jews, Mizrahim (those from 
non-hegemonic Jewish communities originated in Arab and Muslim 
countries)—more than the Ashkenazi middle class. The poorer were also the 
first to be effected, around the millennial turn and even before (Shalev 2012).  
The breakout of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 marked the end of the climax, 
and the anti-climax of the short decade of the Oslo Process. By this term I 
refer to what some would see as euphoric years of peace and liberalization 
(Shafir and Peled 2002), that were abruptly terminated with the 
assassination in 1995 of Israel’s prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. In October 
2000, Israel was on a new track. After declaring the Palestinians not partners 
for peace negotiations, and severely damaging the status of the Palestinian 
citizenry in the October Events5, the state was ready to renew its alliance 
                                                        
5 In October 2000, Palestinian citizens protested in support of the Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories following the stalemate of the Oslo peace process. The protest was met 
by violent suppression, resulting in the killing of 12 Israeli citizens (all but one were 
Palestinian) and one Palestinian from the Territories. The police officers who were found 
responsible for the killing were never tried, and events thereafter continue to overshadow 
the relationship between the Palestinian citizens and the state.  
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with the Jewish middle class based on a new war and profit pact (Peled 2004; 
Shalev and Levy 2005; Grinberg 2013). In 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected as 
prime minister, and appointing Benjamin Netanyahu, an enthusiast 
neoliberal reformer, as Minister of Finance, they aimed to reform the Israeli 
economy. When Sharon was re-elected in the 2003 general elections, he 
made the neoconservative Shinui Party, that raked in 15 seats mainly from 
the established, Ashkenazi middle class, his major coalition partner, and 
more importantly, he excluded the ultra-Orthodox parties which were still 
stalling the dismantling of the welfare safety net (Peled 2004). In subsequent 
years, various segments of society felt the impact of this shift.  
The first to be hit were the Palestinian citizens who, first and foremost, 
suffered a loss of 12 of its people in the October Events. To add insult to 
injury, major voices in Jewish society sought their punishment by calling to 
commercially boycott Arab businesses. Being the poorest in Israeli society, 
Palestinian citizens also suffered from the neoliberal shift as it impacted on 
the labor market, making many unskilled jobs redundant or vulnerable, and 
from the subsequent erosion of welfare benefits. Finally, skilled Palestinians 
who were facing difficulties in capitalizing on their qualifications during 
normal times, were also lagging behind (Shalev 2012). This will explain the 
salience of university graduates among the activists of the post-2011 protest, 
as we shall see below.  
Jewish university students were sensing that they were growing more 
distant from the core of the middle class already towards the end of the 
millennium. As Grinberg (2013: 496-7) noted, they were part of the B 
generation, which implied their prospects for integrating into a precarious 
labor market, and making them feel like second class citizens. This young 
cohort was involved in several industrial actions and strikes during the 
decade prior to the 2011 protest, in which the National Students Union was a 
major player (Ibid.). The 1998 students’ strike, according to Grinberg, was 
also the first to suggest a cross-ethnic alliance in Israeli society, connecting 
Arabs and Jews, Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews, religious and non-religious in 
one struggle. This call should not be taken for granted, given the ethnicized 
structure of Israeli society (Levy 2002).  
Long before the Tents’ Protest, the rolling back of the state was felt at 
society’s margins. In 1990, when Israel was absorbing an influx of 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union, the rising demand for housing 
forced many young, poorer Israelis out of their homes. The Tents’ Protest at 
the time was concentrated in the peripheral outskirts, and was addressed by 
massive state-led construction. Soon after, when the Rabin government 
(1992-1995) led peace negotiations with both the Palestinians and Jordan, it 
9
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was accompanied by an expansive economic policy for the Israeli periphery. 
Yet, the subsequent peace agreement with Jordan proved to be a deathblow 
to parts of the Israeli working class, primarily in the textile industry (Lavie 
2014: 8-9), sending mostly women home. Enhanced privatization resulted in 
downsizing state-held industries in the periphery, and the continuous 
erosion of wages (e.g., Swirski, Konor-Atias and Abu-Khala 2010; Swirski and 
Konor-Atias 2012).6 For a short while, the lower class was protected by a 
relatively solid welfare policy, attributed not only to the legacy of the Israeli 
welfare state (Shalev 2007), but also to the political clout of Jewish ultra-
Orthodox parties which promoted an expansive child allowance policy 
(Shalev 2012). In 2003 however, Sharon’s government was not relying on the 
ultra-Orthodox parties, which left it freer to advance an anti-welfare policy 
and deregulate the financial sector, which resulted in suffering in the margins 
and in more benefits for the established middle class (Peled 2004). Two 
encampments epitomized this moment. 
Vicki Knafo was a single mother of three whose march from her southern 
working class town to Jerusalem and her confrontation with Netanyahu 
made her a symbolic figure of this political re-alliance. Suffering massive cuts 
to her child allowance (Herbst 2013), and diminishing wages, she pitched a 
tent in front of the Ministry of Finance that led to a ten-week encampment of 
single mothers and others who were injured by the erosion of the welfare 
safety net (Lavie 2014: 5). The encampment drew much public attention, 
allowing the Israeli public to focus for a short while on the economy, until a 
Palestinian suicide bomber reverted the media attention to security issues 
(Lavie 2014: 145-6).  
In 2002, Israel Twitto, a social activist, took his three teenage daughters 
whom he raised alone in a deserted bus which they had made their home, to 
camp in Tel Aviv’s exclusive shopping area, The State Circus (Kikar Ha-
Medina), re-naming it The Bread Circus (Kikar Ha-Lekhem7). Similar encamp-
ments spawned in the periphery, allowing Twitto an interval of optimism: 
                                                        
6 For example, Shalev (2012) unravels the economic conditions that underpinned the 2011 
social protest. His analysis shows that young Arab families were not only lagging behind 
their Jewish counterparts, but that their decline had already begun in the mid-1990s when 
the peace negotiations were at their peak. According to the Adva Center’s report, the decade 
before the protest (2001-2011) was “more beneficial to employers than to employees. The 
national income grew by 35%, but while the share of employees rose by 23%, the share of 
employers rose by 85%” (Swirski and Konor-Atias 2012). For a more comprehensive 
political-economic account see Ram 2008.  
7 In Hebrew, Bread Circus is a pun, simultaneously read as a loaf of bread and a public place 
of assembly (landmark, plaza, roundabout) named Bread. 
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“Quiet Revolution” I call it, like [Mahatma] Gandhi, […] Slowly we shall 
wake Israeli society up. It’s not easy to get people out into the streets, 
especially people who are ashamed of their situation. But this revolution 
will succeed, because the government […] does not give the citizens a 
chance to survive. On the contrary, it only creates more difficulties. And 
the more public awareness and sympathy [the protest] receives […] the 
faster it will happen (Sarig 2003). 
This political moment yielded no results, first, because the ethno-national 
divide prevents class-based conflicts from becoming universal, and second, 
because the middle class did not come aboard as it was still hoping to gain 
from the economic shift (e.g., Lavie 2014: 147). Not less significantly though, 
the middle class ignored the inclusive message that came out of these camps: 
“We are not homeless, we are fighting for the character of Israeli society.” 
Here too, the ethnicized structure of society prevented the Ashkenazi middle 
class from joining a call that emerged from the Mizrahi margins. It was not 
until 2011 that these various calls coincided in one big protest.  
J14 or The Tents’ Protest 
Two weeks after the first encampment on Rothschild Boulevard, the protest 
spread like wildfire. Almost on a weekly basis, until early September, tens 
and hundreds of thousands took to the streets of major cities chanting “the 
people demand social justice.” Over 2000 tents were pitched in 41 cities 
across the country, Jewish and Arab, big and small, rich and poor. At one 
point, the event (Isin 2012: 131; Levy 2014: 32-3), was embraced from all 
quarters, including the capitalists against whom it protested. This success 
was also due to a major effort to de-politicize the protest, namely, dis-
sociating the economic situation from the prolonged military subjugation of 
the Palestinian people—primarily in order not to alienate right leaning 
constituencies from the protest’s goals. Yet, in the eyes of Jewish and 
Palestinian citizens in the periphery, the protest was perceived as that of the 
prosperous and comfortable classes who, to quote from a Mizrahi politician, 
“sought cheap rent in metropolitan Tel Aviv” (Levy 2015; see also Kaufman 
and Levy 2014; Shenhav 2013). Eventually the protest dissipated8, leaving 
the public with two commissioned reports that presumably addressed the 
problem of the high cost of living. Where the government’s appointed 
committee was requested to offer solutions without imposing new budgetary 
demands, the Rothschild protest’s self-appointed expert committee sought a 
                                                        
8 Like the Knafo encampment, the 2011 protest benefited from a pause in the violent Israel-
Palestinian conflict. See Grinberg 2013.  
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comprehensively new political-economic order. The latter report remained a 
dead letter, while recommendations by the former were barely implemented.  
A little over a year later, and following another violent clash in the Gaza 
Strip (operation Pillar of Defense), the government reached a deadlock while 
trying to pass the budget bill. Prime minister Netanyahu called for early 
elections to be held in January 2013. Netanyahu’s main coalition ally was the 
newly formed Yesh Atid, a center-right party that had risen from the ashes of 
the protest. However, the promise for new politics focusing on socio-
economic issues was not fulfilled, and in late 2014 Netanyahu called for 
another election. Again the anticipated failure to agree upon the budget bill 
was officially declared as the pretext for this. At this writing, Israel held the 
elections (March 2015) and Netanyahu’s Likud raked in a staggering 30 seats, 
leaving the two winners of the previous elections—Yesh Atid and the national 
religious party, The Jewish Home—heavily impaired.  
Citizenship revisited: From rights to representation 
The processes and protests that I described above and which paved the way 
for the 2011 protest do not fit within the epistemic frameworks which 
shaped the figure of modern liberal citizenship. Rather, they all rest upon and 
reaffirm the figure of the liberal citizen, while striving to make a quantum 
leap. The 2011 event was an opportune moment, when the primacy of the 
national conflict was giving way to the mundane concerns of the citizens, all 
citizens, regardless of ethnic and class divisions. Yet, the moment was over 
when the protest imploded, first, by failing to rise above its own 
contradictions9, and second, because as many times before, security concerns 
took over (Grinberg 2013). But the protest was neither conclusive nor 
terminated, and by helping expose the “element of non-consensuality” (Tully 
2008: 143) underlying the (neo)liberal discourse of rights, it gave way to new 
activists and new actions to break through. These activists, who were 
brought up under the neoliberal governance and through the heydays of the 
politics of recognition, refused to accept the discrepancy between the 
liberalization discourse that prevailed since the 1990s, and the reality of non-
                                                        
9 The protest was confronted with several challenges. Its self-declared leadership did not 
accept the representation of other encampments, thus failing to maintain its democratic face. 
Eventually, the protest was identified solely with the leadership of the Rothschild camp. 
Constant conflicts over representation reflected the difficulty to overcome inherent tensions 
between the center (middle class) and the (ethnic and ethno-national) periphery (lower 
class). Finally, the efforts to keep the protest a-political stood in contradiction to the political 
ambitions of some of its leaders, as well as to a shifting emphasis among the core middle 
class players to the issue of military service of peripheral groups. 
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egalitarianism. They were thus fighting to be heard and to redefine the terms 
of their own representation and voice in the public sphere. This is what is to 
be learned from the following two groups.  
The Not Nice  
In the Israeli collective memory the expression “not nice” connotes the 
utterance, “they are not nice” made by Prime Minister Golda Meir in 1971, 
petrified by the spread of the protest of the Israeli Black Panthers. This was a 
grassroots group of young Mizrahim from Jerusalem’s slum neighborhoods 
who rose against the social, economic and cultural oppression of their 
parents, immigrants from Arab and Muslim countries. While the protest was 
met on the ground with harsh physical force, it was publicly denounced as 
uncivilized and as showing ingratitude to the establishment. This utterance, 
like the one of the Jerusalem mayor who called upon the protesters “to get off 
the grass,” was received as arrogant and dismissive. This condescending 
approach was seared in the Mizrahi memory and is present in much of the 
political discourse to date. Thus, when young activists from the Mizrahi 
periphery sought to speak up on its own behalf the idea to call it The Not Nice 
touched upon an open nerve and resonated with the history of the Mizrahi 
political struggle (Chetrit 2009; Levy 2015). Indeed it was turning the insult 
against its perpetuators, the Ashkenazi hegemonic elite, and to spite them, 
saying, “If you think we’re not nice, we won’t be nice.” Yet, it can similarly be 
read as a rhetorical question: “Tell me, who really isn’t nice?”  
The idea to assemble an activists group was conceived by activists who 
were organized in the Peripheries Forum. This forum brought together 
activists and camps left aside or behind by the main Rothschild protest. 
Barak Segal came up with the idea of forming a group to act from its own 
position, not being marginalized or begging for attention or voice. Together 
with Moshe Cohen, a veteran activist in his hometown, and two activists from 
southern Tel Aviv, they reached out to Carmen Elmakiyes-Amos, who was 
becoming a conspicuous activist during the sporadic attempts to resuscitate 
the protest in 2012, wearing her distinctive black T-shirt with a bold imprint, 
Panther (in the feminine gender form of the word in Hebrew). The idea was 
to act in the name of the peripheries, but as Carmen attested, she saw this as 
another link in the history of Mizrahi struggle, and so they named it The Not 
Nice, now to be printed on their distinctive black T-shirts.  
Carmen, who has become a leading figure of The Not Nice, was active in 
2011 in the Lewinsky encampment in south Tel Aviv. This encampment, only 
a 15-minute walk from the Tent City on Rothschild Boulevard brought 
together social and political activists, mainly feminists and mostly Mizrahim, 
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as well as some activists from the growing asylum-seeker and migrant labor 
communities in the area, and other marginalized groups, like transgender 
and queers (Misgav 2013; Monterescu and Shaindlinger 2013). Soon it 
became clear that despite their proximity, the two encampments presented 
different worlds, that could not be concealed despite their collaboration 
during most of the demonstration events. Carmen was quick to notice this as 
she was coming and going between the two camps during the height of the 
protest. Working as a waitress in a café on Rothschild Boulevard, she found 
herself frequently discussing it with some of the protest leaders. At nights 
she frequented the Lewinsky encampment where she saw the other side. In 
an interview, she explained to me the difference between her experiences:  
I didn’t find myself [on Rothschild]. I saw it as a guys kind of experience. 
They came, pitched tents, feeling cool and hype, drinking beers in the 
evenings, getting drunk and partying. There was nothing, no feeling that 
they were fighting for their lives. And it’s okay, they weren’t fighting for 
their lives, only to bring the rent prices down a little in Tel Aviv. It’s not 
that they had no homes. When it all ended, this group of those who were 
really homeless was left behind, and they turned into a nuisance.  
Sylvie Bitton, a veteran resident and activist in south Tel Aviv and later a 
Not Nice activist, was one of the founders of Lewinsky.10 She physically 
experienced the difference between them and Rothschild, when confronting 
municipal law enforcement accompanied by police who were sent to 
dismantle the tents daily during their first week. Sylvie: ‘They were coming at 
night and kicking us out of the tents, tearing them up and taking us to the 
police station, leaving us there”. After a week of this cat and mouse game, she 
testifies,  
I just stood in tears, shouting at them: “Over my dead body, you won’t 
evacuate us, and for each tent that you take, I’ll put up ten more,” and then 
all the city inspectors probably gave up, one even shed tears with me, and 
they took off. At that moment I said to myself—Sylvie you won. (Italics 
added.) 
This cry to stand for oneself was echoed in the way another Lewinsky 
activist explained her stance in real time on the morning of one of these 
evictions:  
                                                        
10 My analysis also relies on a documentary that covered the Mizrahi-feminist NGO – Achoti 
(lit. my sister) in real time, “The Roar of the South: Stepdaughters of Chuldai” (Dir. Assaf 
Geteniu; part 1; part 2), and an interview with Carmen Elmakyes-Amos, Xnet January 6, 2015 
(all accessed 12.2.2015).  
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If on Rothschild, the students ask for housing, we ask to be students. We 
grew up here in this country by those basic promises that anyone who 
wishes to study can do so and live a reasonable life, and it shattered in our 
face. People here drag their [university] studies for some 12 and 17 years, 
for they can’t pay for it. In this protest it isn’t this voice, the voice of single 
mothers, the dependents, those who can’t carry the burden as if the state 
has already forfeited them that we want to be heard. There are 
transparent people here, who are not seen, not their needs, nor their hope, 
not their dreams. And this is what we’re fighting for, this is [a voice] that 
we want to bring, while strengthening the struggle on Rothschild (Amalia 
Sitton, in The Roar of the South, part 1; italics added). 
Shula Keshet is the head of the Mizrahi feminist NGO Achoti that organized 
the Lewinsky encampment. It was only symbolic that when interviewed for 
the video documenting the camp she had literally lost her voice. Those 
women who were leading the camp were enacting their right to the city 
(Misgav 2013), but for them this was not just a slogan. Unlike the Rothschild 
campers, the neighborhood was their home. It was not surprising then, that 
after winning the battle against the municipality, when visiting protesters 
from Rothschild invited them to move with them, Bitton rejected it 
unequivocally: ‘This is my place, I want to protest here. Everything in the 
south and in the [central bus station neighborhood] concerns me. My interest 
is not in Rothschild. … my protest is here and here it will be.”  
Thus, while the Lewinsky protesters were not asking to split the seemingly 
unified struggle, and as they were marching and chanting “Lewinsky, 
Rothschild, the same revolution,” they knew that these struggles differed 
(Misgav 2013). For Carmen, as we saw above, the difference was substantial. 
Although Rothschild protesters were making reference to Tahrir Square, she 
felt that it was not really linked to these origins: “There’s nothing in common 
between [this quasi-festival] and a struggle.. If I look at what has happened in 
Tahrir a moment ago, or anywhere else, there’s no connection.” In contrast, 
the multiplicity of voices and struggles in Lewinsky of those who were rising 
from the margins and have little to lose, were considered more similar to 
conditions in Egypt or Tunisia.  
From the start, the nucleus of The Not Nice comprised a handful of 
activists, all from disadvantaged backgrounds, typically Mizrahim. Once 
organized, they joined the marches in Tel Aviv as a group, distinctive by their 
own T-shirts and banners that read simply “The Not Nice.” To make their 
voice distinctive they also insisted on starting their march in Tel Aviv’s 
disadvantaged neighborhood, rather than at the bottom of Rothschild 
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Boulevard. where the main march began as a reminder of the Tents’ Protest. 
Another way this group differed was by refusing to seek police permits for its 
rallies, claiming their right to demonstrate as a priori and unconstrained. One 
march had made Carmen feel that they had made a difference, and that their 
effort yielded results, when in a rally that they led from the impoverished Ha-
Tikva neighborhood, hundreds and maybe more citizens were marching with 
them. This is how Carmen described it:  
First of all, there were many from the [2011] protest. Many from the 
Mizrahi struggle, even those who were not in the protests and marches 
before. Many Mizrahi activists joined. … [and we felt] not only that people 
were joining us, but that these are people who hadn’t been in the struggle 
until now, and this was important. Those who didn’t take to the street, 
who didn’t go to Rothschild, or anywhere else. And suddenly they [felt] 
represented. They felt that they can join. That was special.  
Marching in different pathways served also as a metaphor for another 
activist who explained how the place of The Not Nice is different. Riki Kohn, a 
divorced mother of five, a leading activist in this group, says:  
The connection between us and the middle class is, you know, it’s not that 
we don’t march together, [but] we are actually marching on separate 
streets, in opposite directions. The discourse is different, you know, they 
are talking about the cost of living and still fly abroad, and we’re talking 
about homes where there’s nothing for the children, where kids go to 
school and have sandwiches with chocolate spread awaiting them because 
they have nothing at home. 
Indeed, The Not Nice were marching on a separate street. The majority of 
the middle class protesters became (re-)engaged with what they termed as 
the “burden inequality” (Grinberg 2013), which eventually drove them back 
to seek recourse in the formal political system in parties that were promising 
“new politics” (Talshir 2015). The Not Nice, in contrast, did not only stay on 
the streets, as one activist proclaimed, they also remained loyal to their initial 
goals of voicing the plight of the disadvantaged. They became noticeably 
active after a new government was formed. When Yesh Atid’s leader took 
office as Minister of Finance, The Not Nice held a weekly vigil in front of his 
villa in the affluent neighborhood of Ramat Aviv Gimel, demanding revisions 
to the state budget that would meet the needs of the lower echelons of 
society. They also fulfilled the idea of one of its founders and became equal 
partners in other struggles, as was the case with the struggle to offset the 
profits of the newly found gas resources to enhance social programs, as well 
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as the initiators of their own struggles. No longer did they need other 
protesters to grant them access to decision making or to the media.  
Hiraq alshababi  
Hiraq alshababi (hereafter Hiraq), best translated as Youth on the Move, is a 
group of young Palestinian activists mostly from the Negev/Naqeb in the 
south of Israel, home for the majority of the Israeli Bedouin-Palestinian 
population. In 2011, Palestinian citizens took part in the joint Jewish-Arab 
encampments in Haifa and Jaffa (Monterescu and Shaindlinger 2013), but 
while only a few set tents on Rothschild, more protested in exclusively Arab 
localities. Not unexpectedly, most activists were affiliated with the Arab-
Jewish Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE; Kaufman and Levy 
2014), while in Jaffa, for instance, the camp was a home for poor citizens with 
real housing issues, and the activists were mostly local youth identified with 
the National Democratic Alliance (Balad). Still, for the majority of the Arab 
citizenry, the protest was an internal Jewish matter. Yet, when the protest 
died out, new protests spawned in the “Arab Street,” interestingly, revealing 
new faces and new forms of activism. Hiraq is one exemplary group amongst 
several. 
Whereas political activism in Israel’s Arab society is mostly confined to the 
political parties and representative institutions also dominated by the 
parties, the social protest may be seen as a trigger for new street activism. 
The new activists were skeptical of the political parties, but also felt that they 
could not identify with the protest, as Huda, one of the Hiraq founders, said 
retrospectively,  
I was waiting to hear someone say that [Israel] needs to get out of the 
[occupied] territories, or that the protest will be a voice saying all the 
money goes to the [Jewish] settlers. … so if someone who thinks sensibly 
knows that all the money goes to the settlers, and that the settlements 
need to be evacuated, and then, the Tel Avivians will have more money. I 
was waiting for someone to speak out. But I didn’t participate in the 
protest or in any of the demonstrations.  
Fadi, another activist, similarly explained his reasons:  
I am one of those who decided not to take part in the protest, and couldn’t 
understand the place of the Palestinians in it, for the very simple reason 
that half of the [protest] speakers [were making an effort] to de-politicize 
it. [They] didn’t talk about the Occupation, but the cost of cottage cheese. 
[They] didn’t talk about all of that racism, and the racist machinery, but 
the cost of living in Tel Aviv.  
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These voices notwithstanding, activists of Shabab al-Yafoiya, literally, 
Youth of Jaffa—from what was once a major Palestinian city and now a 
neighborhood of Tel Aviv—joined the local Arab-Jewish encampment 
(Monterescu and Shaindlinger 2013: 238-9). The main issue at stake was the 
lack of public housing, mainly due to gentrification processes generated by 
the municipality. The Shabab also joined marches held jointly by the Jaffa 
encampment and the one in the Jewish neighborhood of Ha-Tikva. These 
activists were mostly identified with Balad, yet the protest marked their 
growing independence from the partisan line as well.  
Moreover, the protest was a time to reconsider partisan politics for 
another activist from Jaffa, who was part of a different group. She explains: 
The protest was […] when I disengaged from partisan activism, because 
then I knew that the DFPE Tel Aviv branch became deeply involved in the 
protest. And, are you kidding me? You’re protesting about housing and 
don’t talk about the land issue [i.e., the confiscation of Palestinian owned 
lands after 1948 – G.L.]? [Housing] is the problem? [I’m not talking about] 
the 1967 territories. We’re talking about the 530 villages whose lands 
were confiscated. All this mess, it’s a mess, and the settlements are literally 
a big factory of house-building [referring to the massive building in Jewish 
settlements – G.L.].  
This criticism not only resulted in her leaving the party, but to her calling 
upon friends from the DFPE and Balad, as well as non-partisan Palestinians 
and Jews, to set up their own tent on Rothschild, naming it Tent 48 (alluding 
to the now common reference to the Palestinian citizens as the 1948 
Palestinians). Their slogan—democracy for all, between the Jordan River and 
the sea—had, as she attests, driven the DFPE mad, for it undermined and 
challenged the latter’s belief in the two state solution, and constituted a 
rejection of Balad’s conception of a state of its citizens.  
Withdrawal from partisanship was a recurring theme amongst most 
activists. Having become politically socialized during the period of their 
university studies, young Palestinians usually became the ranks and file of 
the Palestinian political parties, and eventually loyal to them in their adult 
life. However, in our interviews it appeared that many of the youth (in their 
20s and early 30s) no longer see the parties as their only political venue. On 
the contrary (compare Azzellini and Sitrin 2014), as was evident from the 
way Hiraq activists became involved in several struggles, most prominently 
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in cross-partisan mobilization against the government’s plan to resettle the 
Bedouins in the Negev/Naqeb (The Prawer Plan11).  
Hiraq alshababi made its first appearance at the 2013 annual Land Day, 
commemorating the killing of six Palestinian citizens in a 1976 nationwide 
protest against the confiscation of lands.12 Huda explained:  
We began organizing […] in preparation for Land Day, because we didn’t 
want these speeches, [from] the traditional leadership with whom we 
didn’t really agree. Simultaneously, we saw that the struggle against the 
proposed Prawer plan for legislation was not being conducted at the level 
we thought it should be. Then we said, if the youth don’t come, don’t 
participate and don’t boycott everything, then, yalla, it’s the end of the 
Negev and of the future for us and our children. Then we decided to get 
organized.  
In July 2013, the young activists participated in a cross-partisan rally 
against the Prawer Plan. However, the leadership, in agreement with the 
police, wanted to cancel the demonstration. The activists decided not to 
comply and to continue with the march. This led to physical clashes with the 
police, and ultimately was recognized as a turning point in the way 
Palestinian protesting had been handled since the October 2000 events. Like 
The Not Nice, they too refused any formal cooperation with the police, 
perceiving it as an infringement on their right to protest. Similarly, this was 
their position when they sought to organize the Day of Rage. Nevertheless, in 
consideration of the sensitivity among Arab citizenry to crossing the 
boundary of legalism, they applied to the established leaders to request a 
police permit, which they did. Regardless, organizing this protest had been 
their initiative.  
                                                        
11 This recent plan is the most elaborate attempt of the Israeli government to settle the land 
issue in the Negev/Naqeb. Its proclaimed goal is to address the existence of unrecognized 
Bedouin settlements by their relocation and by determining the issue of land ownership 
(mostly by declaring it state land). According to its critics, symptomatically this plan was 
drawn without consultation with the Palestinian themselves, and imposed on them as part of 
yet another state goal – to encourage Jewish citizens to settle in this area. When in 2013 it 
appeared as if the plan was going to be adopted and implemented, Palestinian citizens, 
supported by Jewish activists, sought to stop it by demonstrating against it.  
12 The Land Day on March 30, 1976 marked the first nationwide protest of Palestinian 
citizens against the massive confiscation of lands since 1948. When the police moved to 
suppress the protest, it ended with killing six Palestinians. Since then the Palestinians have 
been commemorating the event in marches that have occasionally become violent. More 
recently the established Arab leadership has been cooperating with the police in order to 
keep the events peaceful. 
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The Day of Rage on November 30, 2013 was to become a significant event 
for this group in three major ways. First, by taking the leading role from the 
traditional leadership, the group was undermining the centrality and 
monopoly of the latter in representing the Arab population. It is of course too 
soon to assess its impact, but one recent example may attest to its 
significance. When the Knesset raised the threshold percentage for votes 
needed to earn Knesset seats to 3.25%—a figure reflecting an interest in 
blocking the Palestinian parties—pressure from the youth was instrumental 
in the parties’ decision to run on a joint list. Second, the refusal of the 
activists to play by the rules—by insisting on not requesting a police permit 
themselves, and then by rejecting the police terms to the protest—was a sign 
that the effect of the October events no longer hovered over the young 
protesters. Many activists reiterated the principle of a non-violent struggle, 
and still, they did not refrain from confrontation with the police force when it 
exerted force. Our interviewee in Haifa, who was the coordinator on the 
ground, attested that she could not stop the march when the police were 
trying to force them off the streets. In the Bedouin town of Hura, where the 
main demonstration took place, matters became violent too. There are those 
who say it was provoked by undercover police officers, and at this writing a 
few protesters are still held in custody for their participation in this event.  
Lastly, the Day of Rage showed the specific organizational characteristics 
of Hiraq and groups of its ilk, as well as their own point of view on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Technology and social media played a big part in their 
organization. As attested by our interviewees, social media connected them 
with a coaching organization abroad, which specializes in social activism, and 
it was used to mobilize support in Israel and in the Palestinian territories, 
and more uniquely, in getting young activists abroad to hold parallel virtual 
demonstrations. Nonetheless, as our interviewee from Haifa suggested, social 
media may also have an exclusion effect: 
If you write a status and garner 200 likes, so you think that you’ve reached 
London. So yes, it satisfies you that the whole world is now talking about 
that. But ultimately, Facebook is not the whole world … it delimits your 
prism at one stage when you think the whole world is here. … It’s only 
Facebook, it’s people on Facebook, it’s not everyone, it’s not the whole 
population. 
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Conclusion  
My goals here were both ambitious and modest. Speaking to the former, I 
suggested that analyzing an Israeli case study may serve as a way of 
accounting for evolving new trajectories for citizenship post-2011. In this 
vein, I explored the three main epistemic frameworks that explained and 
advanced the rise of the rights-bearing citizen. Each of these—NSMs, civil 
society, and deliberative and radical democracy—was a product of its time, 
while all shared an image of the citizen as deserving a civilized existence 
(Benhabib 2004: 172). Yet, each further reshaped the figure of the citizen to 
conform to the rights discourse, thus rendering society a relatively efficient 
liberal and capitalist (Guess 2001). The Israeli Tents’ Protest, like other 
protests since 2011, was a reaction to this process that led to the 
entrenchment of a neoliberal order since the mid-1980s (Ram 2008). It was, 
then, a product of its own time, a reaction to the polarization of wealth and 
income distribution and expanding inequality, to the degree of rendering 
middle class jobs too scarce and precarious (Shalev 2012). Politically, the 
protests responded to practices of governance that did not only prefer 
technocracy over democracy, but also, as Wendy Brown (2011) aptly noted, 
ratified and implemented Margaret Thatcher’s notorious depiction of the 
neoliberal ideal: “There’s no such thing as society, only individual men and 
women, and families.” The extension of anti-neoliberal protests from the 
margins to society’s center, as well as the spread of forms of protest beyond 
national boundaries, thus demonstrated a quest to reinvent society. By 
seeking to weld the people as an active political subject (e.g., Grinberg 2013; 
Ram and Filk 2013; Azzellini and Sitrin 2014), transcending class and ethnic 
boundaries, protesters in Israel and across the globe were redefining the 
ethos of citizenship participation. This new ethos, I propose in final analysis, 
is grounded in a shift away from the ideal of the rights-bearing citizen.  
 Jodi Dean, I believe, was correct in claiming that, “When democracy 
appears as both the condition of politics and the solution to the political 
condition, neoliberalism can’t appear as the violence it is” (Dean 2009: 18). 
Similarly, when citizenship is seen as both the goal and means of political 
change, it is timely to ask what citizenship means, and whether its prospects 
are to encourage social change, or to entrench neoliberal violence. If, then, 
the shift from NSMs through civil society to deliberative and radical democracy 
encapsulated a successful effort to expand and extend the terms of being 
citizens in the liberal sense, the rise of neoliberal citizenship was, to cite Dean 
again, a “victory in defeat.” The political left, she explains, was caught in a 
deadlock because the rights-bearing citizen has become the epitome of 
democracy. Once neoliberalism proclaimed this ideal as its own, to put it 
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bluntly, claiming rights could no longer be a way of seeking social change. At 
most it entailed integrating as equals in a neoliberal order. For this reason, 
the claimant of rights has become mostly the political project of non-citizens 
rather than citizens (e.g., McNevin 2011; Isin 2012).  
This takes me to my modest goal of relating to the Tents’ Protest as a part 
of a whole, in the context of earlier and later acts of citizenship beyond the 
middle class or society’s center. Seeing political struggles and ideas as they 
disseminate from the periphery to the center is not yet common. None the 
less, as I have shown here, 2011 cannot and should not be isolated from the 
acts of resistance that preceded it, nor should it be understood solely as a 
protest led by the middle class or directed by its needs. It is in this broader 
context, I claim, that the ethos of citizen participation has changed. The 
political activism of The Not Nice and Hiraq alshababi attests to this shift from 
right to representation.  
These activists no longer see the right-left continuum which extended over 
more than two centuries, or the big ‘isms’, as their frame of reference (cf. 
Hughes 2011). This continuum that shapes the extant political spectrum and 
to which politicians adhere, is referred to as a masquerade to the violence of 
neoliberalism and to the failure of both the right and the left to bring about 
social change (Dean 2009; Trudell 2012). That said, the activists’ reluctance, 
or, some would say, failure (Gitlin 2012), to articulate an alternative ideology, 
beyond expressing their own voice, raises questions regarding their political 
program or future. This, I believe, remains an open question.  
This new activism, I further argue, poses a challenge to our conception of 
democracy, and hence to the future of citizenship beyond constitutional 
representative democracy (Azzellini & Sitrin 2014). The post-2011 activists 
were socialized under the neoliberal governmentality, yet their origins in, or 
social affinity to the societal margins allow them to move easily across the 
class line. The 2011 protest incited their engagement in agonic games of free 
citizens, through which they constituted themselves as not only political 
subjects (Isin and Nyers 2014: 8). By denying the predominance of the rights 
discourse as determining access to citizenship, and by redefining democracy 
as unsilencing the voice of the unaffiliated, to borrow Rose’s (1996) term for 
those forsaken by neoliberalism, they pose what Foucault termed as “a 
permanent provocation” (cited in Tully 2008: 143) to the ethos of citizen 
participation. In the Israeli context, this already seems to delineate new 
trajectories for citizenship and democracy that places the voice of the 
marginalized groups at the center of the political debate.  
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